Book Review of Animal Suffering: The Science of Animal Welfare by Singer, Peter
  
 
 
31 
MARIAN STAMP DAWKINS J ANIMAL 
SUFFERINr: THE SCIENCE OF ANIMAL 
WELF,Rt LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL LTD.DISTRIBUTEP IN THE UNITED 
STATES BY METHUEN) 19~OJ 14~ PP. 
£7.50, $19.95 (Hardback) £3.95, $9.95 
(Paperback) • 
If you know that practices like factory 
farming are cruel, and don't want to be 
bothered with the evidence, you won't be 
interested in this book; on the other 
hand, if you want to be able to argue 
with hard-headed scientists and agri­
culturalists who demand evidence for 
claims that chickens suffer when con­
fined in battery cages, don't hesitate: 
order your copy of Animal Suffering 
today. 
When the book comes, it may not be quite 
what you expect. It is not a crusading 
polemic against the now-familiar targets 
of factory farming, experimentation 
and hunting. Nor is it a philosophical 
argument about animals and ethics; 
Instead it is something quite new: 
a sober, scientific investigation 
into ways in which we can assess 
whether an animal is suffering. The 
only book at all like it that has 
appeared in recent years is Donald 
Griffin's The Question of Animal Awareness 
(New York, 1976), but where Griffin
 
limited himself to the modest ai~ of
 
persuading scientists to take account of
 
the fact that animals other than humans
 
may be conscious, Dawkins tackles the
 
bolder task of detecting suffering.
 
Thus Dawkins' aim is not to argue that 
battery cages, for example, do or do 
not cause suffering to hens. She is 
interested rather in how we can set 
about to answer such a question. Should 
we accept the views of the farmers who 
say that the hens must be happy, because 
otherwise the farm wouldn't be profitable? 
Or should we be satisfied with thinking 
about how we would hate to be cooped ~p
in a small cage all day? Dawkins' 
says that neither of these approaches 
will do, and there is a need for some­
thing better. 
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Those who lobby in defense of factory 
farming often argue that productivity 
is the only 'scientific' measure of 
animal welfare. They seek to portray 
their animal liberationist opponents 
as emotional, unscientific sentimentalists 
who commit the notorious fallacy of anthro­
pomorphism. Of course, this kind of argu­
ment finds willing ears among those who 
don't feel inclined to alter their diet 
in order to avoid factory farm produce. 
Perhaps the chief significance of Dawkins' 
book, therefore, is that she believes 
there can be scientific and objective 
ways of assessing animal welfare which 
are not based on productivity. More­
over she sets out in some detail the 
ways in which this can be done. 
The methods of assessing welfare that 
Dawkins discusses are--in addition to 
'productivity'--observations of the 
animal's physical health, study of the 
degree to which its living conditions 
are unnatural, physiological obser­
vations of hormone changes associated 
with stress, observation of behavior, 
especially abnormal or stereotypic 
behavior, analogies with ourselves, 
and tests in -which animals are allowed 
to choose for themselves. In each 
case she sets out the difficulties 
that lie in the way of getting an insight 
into the subjective experiences of 
another creature, but she also makes 
it clear that these difficulties 
are not in principle insuperable. While 
no method is adequate on its own, a 
combination of several methods can 
give us a good indication of whether 
an animal is suffering. 
Of these methods the most interesting is 
the method that allows the animal to 
choose for itself. Dawkins' own work 
has been in this area, She has, for 
example, placed hens in the middle of 
a corridor, one end of which leads to 
a battery cage and the other to an open 
run, Even when the birds have been 
raised in a cage environment and have 
never seen an open run, they need only 
a few minutes exposure to it before 
they will choose it consistently over 
the cage, 
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whichi  one  thet  hens  are  happieri  in.. But
t 
that  kindi  of  casuall observationti  is  not
t  
alwaysl  reliable,, and  a  carefull test  of
  
thet  animals'i l ' actualt l preferences  can
  
providei  valuablel l  confirmation.i  Some­
-
times  it  can  even  provide  evidence
  
for  rejecting  the  opinions  of  careful
  
observers.  A  striking  instance  of
  
this  was  a  test  of  the  recommendation
  
of  the  British  Government's'  Brambell
  
Committee  that  fine  gauge  wire  mesh
 
should  not  be  used  for  the  floor  of
  
battery  cages.  The Committee  thought
  
that  the  birds  were  more  comfortable
  
on  a heavier  metal  mesh.  In  fact,
  
when given  a choice,  hens  spend  much
 
more time  on the  finer  wire.  so
  
presumably  they  prefer  it.
  
The possibilities  of  this  method  are  
limited  only  by  the  bounds  of  our  imagi­-
nation in devising ways of letting 
animals choose. Pigs can be trained 
to adjust lighting and heating with 
their snouts; in this way they tell 
us that they don't like the semi­-
darkness that prevails in many inten­-
sive farms. As Dawkins says: 
Animals may not be able to 
talk, but they can vote with 
their feet and express some 
of what they are feeling by 
where they choose to go. 
If they were to be provided 
with the right electronic 
gadgetry, who knows what 
they could tell us, by 
voting with their snouts 
or their paws or their 
beaks? 
(In Animal Liberation I said that 
since animals can't vote, it is mean­-
ingless to talk of their right to vote. 
Perhaps I was too hasty.) 
In addition to being a careful scientist 
and a lucid writer of jargon-free 
prose (already an unusual combination) 
Dawkins reveals a breadth of under­-
standing rare in scientists working 
in animal behavior. In addition to 
the obviously relevant books like 
Richardi  Ryder's'  Victimsi ti  of Sciencei  
and my own Animali l Liberation,i ti , she 
refers Jonathantot  ~? Glover'sl '  Causingi  
Deatht  and  Savingi  Lives,i , and  even  
Tom  Nagel'sl'  'What' t is  it  like  tot  be  
a  bat?'' (Phil.il. Review,i , 1974).. I  found  
onlyl  one  pointi t tot  criticise:  she  is  
unfair  to  Richard  Ryder  when she  
asserts  (on  p.  3)  that  he  claimed  that  
two-thirds  of  all  experiments  in  Britain  
are  for  non-medical  purposes  (a  claim  
which  she  then  shows  to  be  erroneous).  
In  fact  what  Ryder  actuahly  said  was  
that  less  than  a third  of  experiments  
'can  be  seen  to  be  medical.'  He was 
making  no claim  as  to  the  actual  
figures  but  a point  about  what  can  
be  seen  by  the  statistics  provided  by  
the  government.  
All  in  all.  though,  a splendid  book  which  
may well  prove  to  be  the  foundation  
stone  of  a new science  of  animal  welfare.  
Peter Singer 
Monash University 
